Market Reactions to Zero or Small Positive Sales Surprise by Ma, Jiameng
45
Journal of Economic Science Research | Volume 02 | Issue 03 | July 2019
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0 DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i3.1100
Journal of Economic Science Research
http://ojs.bilpublishing.com/index.php/jesr
REVIEW
Market Reactions to Zero or Small Positive Sales Surprise
Jiameng Ma*
School of Management, Shanghai University, Shanghai, 200444, China
ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT
Article history
Received: 30 June 2019
Accepted: 13 July 2019
Published Online: 26 July 2019
This paper studies how the stock market reacts to zero or small positive 
sales surprise. Using data from firms listed in the U.S., the paper shows 
that before 2003 investors react more to positive earnings surprises while 
after 2003 they react more to the opposite. When sales forecasts are first 
reported, investors believe in sales numbers and favor firms that meet or 
beat sales forecasts, but after 2003, investors grow skeptical, realize the 
possibility of sales management and trust more in negative sales surpris-
es. One thing in common for both two samples is that Sales Response 
Coefficients of extreme sales surprises are smaller than those of moderate 
sales surprises.
Keywords:
Sales surprise
Market reaction
Sales response coefficient
　
*Corresponding Author:
Jiameng Ma,
School of Management, Shanghai University, 99 Shangda Road, Shanghai, 200444, China;
E-mail: majiameng8918@163.com 
1. Literature and hypotheses
Analysts play a role in firm valuation by providing performance benchmarks. Previous literature (Bartov, Givoly and Hayn (2002); Kasznik and 
McNicholw (2002); and Lopez and Rees (2002))[1,2,3] has 
documented market premium (penalty) to meeting or 
beating (mssing) analysts’ earnings forecasts, a primary 
performance benchmark, after controlling for forecast error 
magnitude. Given the importance of meeting or beating 
earnings forecasts, Degeorge, Patel and Zeckhauser (1999) 
[4] show that earnings falling just below the forecasts will 
be managed upward to meet or beat the thresholds by small 
margins, and Burgstahler and Eames(2006) [5] find an un-
usually low(high) number of reported annual earnings fall 
just below (above) the analyst benchmark. And Keung, Lin 
and Shih (2010) [6]  take a step further and show that there 
exists a cost for earnings management to meet earnings 
forecasts and that the cost is actually for both confirmed 
manipulators and mere “ suspects”.
Obviously, the market also has access to other analyst 
benchmarks, such as sales forecast. Sales forecast is a mar-
ket signal almost as influential as earnings one in that sales 
forecast is reported together with earnings forecast and it 
is of the public and media interest whether a firm meets or 
misses sales forecasts. For example, CNNMoney writes 
about Apple performance predictions as “The consensus 
among the pros -- earnings of $13.45 on sales of $54.74 bil-
lion -- represents growth of 4% and 27%, respectively. The 
median estimate among all 65 analysts is for earnings of 
$14.20 on sales of $55.96 billion, up 10% and 30%, respec-
tively” (Handicapping Apple’s quarterly earnings and sales: 
Q1 2013, CNNMoney, January15, 2013: 4:05 PM ET). In 
addition, CNNMoney reports “IBM released third-quarter 
results Wednesday that missed sales forecasts by over $1 
billion, as the company’s hardware business took a hit from 
the transition to the cloud” (IBM misses sales forecasts, 
CNNMoney, October 16, 2013: 5:22 PM ET). Similar to 
earnings forecast error studies, Rees and Sivaramakrish-
nan (2007) [7]  find a significant association between sales 
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forecast errors and abnormal returns around the earnings 
announcement date and show that the market premium 
(penalty) to meeting or beating (missing) earnings forecasts 
is accentuated when sales forecasts are also met (missed) 
and that no evidence of an equity premium or penalty when 
the earnings and sales signals conflict.
Now that sales forecast is attached great importance to 
by the market and there is also negative market reaction of 
missing sales forecast, I propose the following two hypoth-
eses:
Hypothesis I: Firms manage sales to meet analyst sales 
forecasts.
Hypothesis II: There is cost for sales management to 
meet analyst sales forecasts.
2. Sample
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Figure 1. Frequency distribution of sales surprise per share 
in 2-cent bins in a range from -50 cents to 50 cents using 
quarterly observations in 1999-2006.
For this study, I obtain actual sales, consensus sales fore-
casts, actual earnings and consensus earnings forecasts from 
I/B/E/S, and stock and market return data and share price 
data from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
Following Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) [5], Brown and 
Caylor (2005) [8] and Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) [6], I 
delete from my sample firms with SIC codes 4400-5500 
(regulated industry) and 6000-6500 (financial institutions). 
In addition, I delete firm-quarters with sales surprises in 
the top and bottom 1% to avoid potential outliers. The final 
sample consists of 58,063 firm-quarters from 1999 to 2006. 
The period 1999-2006 is chosen to make results of this 
study comparable with those of Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) 
[6], whose sample period covers 1992 to 2006. Keung, Lin 
and Shih (2010) [6] document a cost for earnings manage-
ment to meet earnings forecasts, which is the most relevant 
literature to my study of whether there is a cost for sales 
management to meet sales forecasts. The sample starts from 
1999 because there is no sales forecast until 1996 and 1999 
is the first year that sees significantly large number of sales 
forecasts.
To examine whether firms also manage sales to meet 
analyst sales forecasts, I follow previous literature (Beaver, 
McNichols, and Nelson, 2007) [9], Dechow, Richardson, and 
Tuna (2003) [10], Degeorge, Patell, and Zeckhauser (1999) 
[4], and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) [5]) and test whether 
there is a distribution discontinuity at zero. Figure 1 plots 
the frequency distribution of sales surprise per share, SS 
(calculated as actual sales per share minus the latest consen-
sus analyst sales forecast and scaled by number of shares 
outstanding) in 2-cent bins in a range from -50 cents to 50 
cents using quarterly observations over the whole sample 
period. The distribution is basically symmetric, but there 
are significantly less SS in the 2-cent bin just to the left of 
zero compared with the 2-cent bin just to the right of zero 
(t-statistic=3.36). Consistent with prior finding that meet or 
beat sales forecast is an important threshold for managers, 
the significant discontinuity at zero supports Hypothesis I 
that firms manage sales to meet analyst sales forecasts. And 
the significant SS percentage difference in the 2-cent bins 
around zero shows that like earnings management firms 
manage sales also by a small margin.
Based on the finding that firms prefer to meet or beat 
sales forecasts by a small margin rather than a large margin, 
I investigate the trend of sales management over the sample 
period. Following Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) [6], I measure 
the trend by calculating the sales manipulation index for 
each year from 1999 to 2006. Sales manipulation index, 
SMI, is defined as the number of SS in [0￠ , 2￠ ] (“just 
make it”) divided by the number in [-2￠ , 0￠ ] (“just miss 
it”) each year. Figure 2 illustrates SMI for each year in the 
whole sample period. An SMI always larger than one means 
that there are always more SSs in “just make it” range than 
in “just miss it” range, confirming findings in Figure 1 that 
firms manage sales to meet analyst sales forecasts and do so 
by small margin. SMI of magnitude less than 2, however, 
is much smaller than earnings manipulation index docu-
mented in Figure 1 by Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) whose 
magnitude averages 3.6 ((2.68+4.19+3.92)/3) in the whole 
sample period. This shows that although sales manipulation 
exists, it is far less pervasive than earnings manipulation. 
Figure 2. Annual ratio of number of sales surprise per 
share in the range [0￠ , 2￠ ] to number of sales surprise 
per share in the range [-2￠ , 0￠ ) in 1999-2006.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i3.1100
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When sales forecast is first widely reported in 1999, 
SMI is on a relatively high level of around 1.7. Then it 
sees a steady decline of around 20% ((1.4-1.7)/1.7) since 
2000 and stables at around 1.4 ever since except that in 
2003 it hits the record high of about 1.7 and falls to 1.4 
again in the next year. This trend is basically consistent 
with that of earnings manipulation index suggested by 
Figure 1 (Keung, Lin and Shih (2010)) where earnings 
manipulation index also sees a steady decline from 1999 
to 2006. The only difference lies in the time of sudden in-
crease: 2003 for SMI and 2002 for earnings manipulation 
index.
Following Keung, Lin and Shih (2010), I partition 
the whole sample periods into two equal-length periods: 
1999-2002 and 2003-2006. Through investigating market 
reactions to sales surprise before and after 2003 when 
there is a sudden increase and decrease in SMI, I offer 
explanation to SMI trend of periods 1999-2002 and 2003-
2006.
3. Methodology and results
To examine whether there is cost for sales management to 
meet analyst sales forecasts, I analyze market reactions to 
a zero or small positive sales surprise. Following the idea 
of Earnings Response Coefficient, ERC, I calculate Sales 
Response Coefficient, SRC, to proxy for market response 
to sales surprise. If there is cost for sales management, in-
vestors are less likely to believe in the informativeness of 
reported sales number and thus stock price is less likely to 
react to sales surprise. Given that, SRC will be smaller for 
zero or small positive sales surprises. 
Similar to previous literature (Easton and Zmijewski 
(1989) [11], DeFond and Park (2001) [12], Bartov, Givoly, 
and Hayn (2002) [1], Brown and Caylor (2005) [8], and 
Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) [6]), I estimate SRC by re-
gressing abnormal returns on sales surprise per share 
scaled by stock price. Since actual earnings numbers are 
announced at the same day as actual sales numbers, and 
prior studies suggest significant market response to earn-
ings surprise, I also control for earnings surprise scaled by 
stock price:
 ,
where CAR is cumulative abnormal returns at the sales 
announcement, SS is sales surprise per share calculated as 
actual sales per share minus the latest consensus analyst 
sales forecast and divided by number of shares outstand-
ing, ES is earnings surprise, calculated as actual earnings 
per share minus the latest consensus analyst earnings fore-
cast, and P is share price. The coefficient  in the regres-
sion is the SRC and  is the ERC. 
Following Keung, Lin and Shih (2010), my CAR pe-
riod contains three days starting one day before the sales 
announcement date and ending one day after. To inves-
tigate whether SRC is smaller for zero or small positive 
sales surprises, I partition SS for all firm-quarters into 6 
ranges and estimate the SRC for each range separately. 
Range S-4 includes SS’s less than -8￠ , S-3 includes SS’s 
in [-8￠ , -4￠ ), S-2 includes SS’s in [-4￠ , -2￠ ), S-1 
includes SS’s in [-2￠ , 0￠ ), S0 includes SS’s in [0￠ , 
2￠ ],  S1 includes SS’s in (2￠ , 4￠ ], S2 includes SS’s 
in (4￠ , 8￠ ], S3 includes SS’s greater than 8￠ . I also 
control for earnings surprise partitioned into 14 ranges as 
Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) do and estimate the ERC for 
each range separately. Range E−7 includes ES’s less than 
−8￠ , E-6 includes ES’s in the range [−8￠ , −6￠ ), E-5 
includes ES’s in [−6￠ , −4￠ ), E-4 includes ES’s in [−4￠ , 
−3￠ ), E−3 includes ES’s in [−3￠ , −2￠ ), E−2 includes 
ES’s in [−2￠ , −1￠ ), E−1 includes ES’s in [−1￠ , 0￠ ), 
E0 includes ES’s in [0￠ , 1￠ ], E1 includes ES’s in (1￠ , 
2￠ ], E2 includes ES’s in (2￠ , 3￠ ], E3 includes ES’s in 
(3￠ , 4￠ ], E4 includes ES’s in (4￠ , 6￠ ], E5 includes 
ES’s in (6￠ , 8￠ ], and E6 includes ES’s greater than 8￠ .
Following Keung, Lin and Shih (2010), my regression 
model is as below:
where 
CAR[-1, 1]: cumulative abnormal returns from one day 
before to one day after the earnings announcement;
 CAR[-20, -2]: cumulative abnormal returns from 20 days 
before to 2 days before the earnings announcement;
SS/P: sales surprise (SS) scaled by share price 21 days 
before the earnings announcement date (P);
ES/P: earnings surprise (ES) scaled by share price 21 
days before the earnings announcement date (P); 
DSk: sales surprise dummy, equal to 1 if SS falls in 
Range Sk and 0 otherwise; and
DEk: earnings surprise dummy, equal to 1 if ES falls in 
Range Ek and 0 otherwise.
I estimate cumulative abnormal returns as follows:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i3.1100
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where ARjt is daily abnormal returns estimated using 
estimates of the coefficients of the market model over the 
255-day period ending 41 days before the earnings an-
nouncement, Rjt is the return for firm j on day t, and Rmt is 
the equally weighted market return on day t:
Table 1. Variation of the SRC and ERC across SS Ranges 
and ES Ranges respectively
variables 
  1999-2002   2003-2006 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 
 
0.00 -2.87*** 
 
0.00 -2.8*** 
CAR[−20, −2] 
 
0.01 2** 
 
-0.02 -4.66*** 
SS/P for SS in 
      (<−8￠) 
 
0.01 2.22** 
 
0.05 7.77*** 
[-8￠, -4￠) 
 
-0.17 -1.62 
 
1.02 7.34*** 
[-4￠, -2￠) 
 
0.45 1.3 
 
1.08 4.13*** 
[-2￠, 0￠) 
 
-0.34 -0.65 
 
5.24 8.78*** 
[0￠, 2￠] 
 
0.84 1.46 
 
-2.61 -4.11*** 
(2￠, 4￠] 
 
1.46 3.73*** 
 
0.08 0.22 
(4￠, 8￠] 
 
0.43 2.27** 
 
0.55 3.83*** 
(>8￠) 
 
0.05 4.95 
 
0.04 5.35*** 
ES/P for ES in  
     (<−8￠) 
 
0.01 2.84*** 
 
0.00 0.36 
[-8￠, -6￠) 
 
0.50 2.98*** 
 
1.82 7.81*** 
[-6￠, -4￠) 
 
0.50 2.03** 
 
0.81 3.5*** 
[-4￠, -3￠) 
 
0.25 0.64 
 
-0.82 -3.14*** 
[-3￠, -2￠) 
 
1.10 1.97* 
 
2.33 5.36*** 
[-2￠, -1￠) 
 
4.08 3.61*** 
 
2.10 2.92*** 
[-1￠, 0￠) 
 
-2.33 -1 
 
0.73 0.92 
[0￠, 1￠] 
 
3.05 3.28*** 
 
6.28 6.24*** 
(1￠, 2￠] 
 
1.43 2.63*** 
 
3.78 5.99*** 
(2￠, 3￠] 
 
0.89 2.38** 
 
4.04 8.95*** 
(3￠, 4￠] 
 
1.21 2.73*** 
 
-0.02 -0.04 
(4￠, 6￠] 
 
0.57 2.63*** 
 
2.47 10.2*** 
(6￠, 8￠] 
 
0.61 3.33*** 
 
2.75 11.53*** 
(>8￠) 
 
0.00 0.16 
 
0.00 -0.74 
       Adj. R-sq  0.01   0.02  
 
I estimate the regression model with data pooled 
across firm-quarters. Table 1 and Figure 3 report results 
for firm-quarters in the periods 1999-2002 and 2003-
2006 separately. There is a distinct difference between 
1999-2002 sample and 2003-2006 sample. As shown in 
Panel A of Figure 3, for the 1999-2002 sample SRCs of 
all the positive sales surprise ranges are larger than zero 
while as shown in Panel B of Figure 3, for the 2003-
2006 sample SRCs of all the negative sales surprise 
ranges are larger than zero. This suggests that before 
2003 investors react more to positive earnings surprises 
while after 2003 they react more to the opposite. When 
sales forecasts are first reported, investors believe in 
sales numbers and favor firms that meet or beat sales 
forecasts, but after 2003, investors grow skeptical, real-
ize the possibility of sales management and trust more 
in negative sales surprises. But one thing in common for 
both two samples is that SRCs of extreme sales surprises 
are smaller than those of moderate sales surprises, con-
firming the finding in Keung, Lin and Shih (2010) that 
moderate sales surprises are considered to be more sus-
tainable. 
Figure 3. Variation in SRC across sales surprise ranges 
Panel A: 1999-2002 Sample
Figure 3. Variation in SRC across sales surprise ranges 
Panel B: 2003-2006 Sample
There is another interesting anomaly. In 1999-2002 
sample, SRC of [-2￠ , 0￠ ) is the smallest of the whole 
sample while SRC of [0￠ , 2￠ ] is one of the largest. 
Therefore, an increase of Sales Manipulation Index in 
2003 may be due to the big reward for “just make it” and 
big penalty for “just miss it”. But it is a totally different 
story in 2003-2006 sample. SRC of [-2￠ , 0￠ ) is the 
largest of the whole sample while SRC of [0￠ , 2￠ ] 
is the only (significantly) negative and the smallest one. 
This change is a signal of investor skepticism toward 
zero and small positive sales surprises and gives ex-
planation to the drop of Sales Manipulation Index after 
2003. 
To sum up, regression results support hypothesis II 
and document costs for sales management to meet ana-
lyst sales forecasts after 2003.
To test the robustness of the result, I also change the 
size of sales surprise ranges and run the same regression 
again. Table 2 and Figure 4 report the results which also 
supports hypothesis II.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jesr.v2i3.1100
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Table 2. Variation of the SRC and ERC across SS Ranges 
and ES Ranges respectively
variables 
  1999-2002   2003-2006 
  Coef. t-stat.   Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 
 
-0.00257 -2.82*** 
 
0.00 -2.99*** 
CAR[−20, −2] 
 
0.00863 1.99** 
 
-0.02 -4.61*** 
SS/P for SS in 
      (<−8￠) 
 
0.00982 2.3** 
 
0.05 7.68*** 
[-8￠, -3￠) 
 
-0.14019 -1.37 
 
0.99 7.62*** 
[-3￠, 0￠) 
 
0.09788 0.26 
 
2.21 6.38*** 
[0￠, 3￠] 
 
0.82332 1.84* 
 
-1.21 -2.85*** 
(3￠, 8￠] 
 
0.60281 3.42*** 
 
0.59 4.26*** 
(>8￠) 
 
0.04993 4.87*** 
 
0.04 5.49*** 
ES/P for ES in  
     (<−8￠) 
 
0.00453 2.51** 
 
0.00 0.42 
[-8￠, -6￠) 
 
0.50237 2.98*** 
 
1.89 8.11*** 
[-6￠, -4￠) 
 
0.52328 2.11** 
 
0.92 3.98*** 
[-4￠, -3￠) 
 
0.21522 0.54 
 
-0.75 -2.92*** 
[-3￠, -2￠) 
 
0.93853 1.69* 
 
2.74 6.37*** 
[-2￠, -1￠) 
 
4.39017 3.92*** 
 
2.47 3.43*** 
[-1￠, 0￠) 
 
-2.29935 -0.98 
 
1.30 1.65* 
[0￠, 1￠] 
 
3.3459 3.8*** 
 
5.66 5.64*** 
(1￠, 2￠] 
 
1.53061 2.84*** 
 
3.38 5.37*** 
(2￠, 3￠] 
 
0.90639 2.43** 
 
3.78 8.46*** 
(3￠, 4￠] 
 
1.23086 2.78*** 
 
-0.26 -0.65 
(4￠, 6￠] 
 
0.52692 2.45** 
 
2.39 9.88*** 
(6￠, 8￠] 
 
0.59578 3.25*** 
 
2.69 11.27*** 
(>8￠) 
 
0.00142 0.26 
 
0.00 -0.74 
       Adj. R-sq  0.01   0.02  
 
Figure 4. Variation in SRC across sales surprise ranges 
Panel A: 1999-2002 Sample
Figure 4. Variation in SRC across sales surprise ranges 
Panel B: 2003-2006 Sample
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